e economic participation by everyone and the
unconditional avoidance of an economic war; a war of that nature
must be excluded from all future contingencies. Before we conclude
peace we must have the positive assurance that our present enemies
have given up that idea.

Those, my honourable friends, are the principles of the new world
organisation as it presents itself to me, and they are all based
on general disarmament. Germany, in her answer to the Papal Note,
has also positively recognised the idea of a general disarmament.
Our present enemies have likewise, partly at any rate, adopted
these principles. I differ from Lloyd George in most points, but
agree thoroughly on one--that there nevermore should be a war of
revenge.

The impression made by my speech on the Entente surpassed the most
pessimistic expectations. In order not to approach too closely the
subject of their own disarmament, my propositions were said to be
hypocritical and a peace trap. This needs no comment.

Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the support of and secure a
guarantee from Germany that she would disarm, it would have been an
opportunity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise the
greatest possible pressure on Germany's leaders. But the sword was
knocked out of my hand by the Entente themselves, for the retort came
from Berlin: Here is the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of
disarmament as they reject everything coming from us. There is only
one way out of it--a fight to the end and then victory.

Again did the Entente force the peoples of the Central Powers to side
unconditionally with the generals.

Never in the whole term of my office did I receive so many letters as
after my speech--both for and against, with both sides equally
impetuous. "Death sentences" from Germany were showered on me; scorn
and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and agreement.

In the autumn of 1917 the peace movement diminished visibly. The
U-boat fiasco was very obvious. England saw that she was able to
overcome the danger. The German military leaders still spoke of the
positively expected successes of their submarines, but the tenor of
their predictions became very different. There was no longer any talk
of the downfall of England within a few months. A new winter campaign
was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted that though
mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this was not so respecting