rsonnel and
Administration Division, as recorder without vote.]

The conclusions and recommendations of the Chamberlin Board represent
perhaps the most careful and certainly the last apologia for a
segregated Army.[17-3] The Army's postwar racial policy and related
directives, the board assured Secretary Gray, were sound, were proving
effective, and should be continued in force. It saw only one objection
to segregated units: black units had an unduly high proportion of men
with low classification test scores, a situation, it believed, that
could be altered by raising the entrance level and improving training
and leadership. At any rate, the board declared, this disadvantage was
a minor one compared to the advantages of an organization that did not
force Negroes into competition they were unprepared to face, did not
provoke the resentment of white soldiers with the consequent risk of
lowered combat effectiveness, and avoided placing black officers and
noncommissioned officers in command of white troops, "a position which
only the exceptional Negro could successfully fill."

[Footnote 17-3: Memo, Gen Chamberlin et al. for SA, 9
Feb 50, sub: Report of Board of Officers on
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, AG 291.2
(6 Dec 49). A copy of the report and many of the
related and supporting documents are in CMH.]

A decision on these matters, the board stated, had to be based on
combat effectiveness, not the use of black manpower, and what
constituted maximum effectiveness was best left to the judgment of
war-tested combat leaders. These men, "almost without exception,"
vigorously opposed integration. Ignoring the Army's continuing (p. 430)
negotiations with the Fahy Committee on the matter, the board called
for retaining the 10 percent quota. To remove the quota without
imposing a higher entrance standard, it argued, would result in an
influx of Negroes "with a corresponding deterioration of combat
efficiency." In short, ignoring the political and budgetary realities
of the day, the board called on Secretary Gray to repudiate the
findings of the Fahy Committee and the stipulations of Executive Order
9981 and to maintain a rigidly segregated service with a carefully
regulated percentage of black members.

While Gray and Collins let the recommendations of the Chamberlin Board
go unanswered, they did v