of the Army Pace
kept the President informed.[17-51]

[Footnote 17-47: Ridgway, _The Korean War_, p. 192.]

[Footnote 17-48: Section 401, Army Organization Act of
1950 (PL 581, 81st Cong.), published in DA Bull 9,
6 Jul 50. See also Msg, DA to CINCFE, DA 92561, 28
May 51; G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS and SA, 14 May
51, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower; Memo for
Rcd, G-1 (ca. 14 May 51). All in G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-49: G-1 Summary Sheets for CofS, 18 and
23 May 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Troops in
FECOM, G-1 291.2. See also Elva Stillwaugh's study,
"Personnel Problems in the Korean Conflict," pp.
26-29, in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-50: See, for example, Msg, DA to CINCFE,
DA 92561, 28 May 51; Msg, CINCFE to DA, C6444, 8
Jun 51.]

[Footnote 17-51: Memo, Actg CofS for SA, 28 May 51,
sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, CS 291.2.]

Pace had succeeded Gordon Gray as secretary in April 1950 and
participated in the decisions leading to integration. A
Harvard-trained lawyer with impressive managerial skills, Pace did not
originate any of the Army's racial programs, but he fully supported
the views of his Chief of Staff, General Collins.[17-52] Meeting with
his senior civilian assistants, the G-1 and G-3 of the Army, and
Assistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg on 9 June, Pace admitted that
their discussions were being conducted "probably with a view to
achieving complete integration in the Army." Nevertheless, he stressed
a cautionary approach because "once a step was taken it was very much
harder to retract." He was particularly worried about the high
percentage of black soldiers, 12.5 percent of the Army's total,
compared with the percentage of Negroes in the other services. He
summarized the three options still under discussion in the Department
of the Army: Ridgway's call for complete integration in Korea, followed
by integration of Army elements in Japan, with a 10 percent limit (p. 444)
on black replacements; Mark Clark's proposal to ship black combat
battalions to Korea to be used at the division commanders' discretion,
with integration limited to combat-tested individuals and then only in
suppo