as
to continue successfully.[17-62]

[Footnote 17-60: Ibid.; Stillwaugh, "Personnel
Problems in the Korean Conflict," pp. 33-35.]

[Footnote 17-61: Msg, CSA to CINCFE, DA 96489, 18 Jul
51.]

[Footnote 17-62: Journal Files, G-1, FEC, Oct 51,
Annex 2.]

[Illustration: MACHINE GUNNERS OF COMPANY L, 14TH INFANTRY, _Hill 931,
Korea, September 1952_.]

Ridgway was particularly concerned with the strain on his program
caused by the excessive number of black combat replacements swelling
the percentage of Negroes in his combat units. By September black
combat strength reached 14.2 percent, far above the limits set by
the Army staff. Ridgway wanted combat replacements limited to 12 (p. 447)
percent. He also proposed that his command be allowed to request
replacements by race and occupational specialty in order to provide
Army headquarters with a sound basis for allotting black enlisted men
to the Far East. While the Army staff promised to try to limit the
number of black combat troops, it rejected the requisition scheme.
Selection for occupational specialist training was not made by race,
the G-1 explained, and the Army could not control the racial
proportions of any particular specialty. Since the Army staff had no
control over the number of Negroes in the Army, their specialties or
the replacement needs of the command, no purpose would be served by
granting such a request.[17-63]

[Footnote 17-63: Rad, CINCFE for DA, DA IN 182547, 11
Sep 52, sub: Negro Personnel; Msg, DA to CINCFE, 23
Sep 52, G-1 291.2.]

Yet Ridgway's advice could not be ignored, because by year's end the
whole Army had developed a vested interest in the success of
integration in the Far East. The service was enjoying the praise of
civil rights congressmen, much of the metropolitan press, and even
some veterans' groups, such as the Amvets.[17-64] Secretary Pace was
moved to call the integration of the Eighth Army a notable advance in
the field of human relations.[17-65] But most of all, the Army began
to experience the fruits of racial harmony. Much of the conflict and
confusion among troops that characterized the first year of the war
disappeared as integration spread, and senior officials commented
publicly on the superior military efficiency of an integrated Army in
Korea.[17-6