ction. Continued segregation, on the other hand, would force
the Army to reinstate the old division-size black unit, with its
ineffectiveness and frustrations, to answer the Negro's demand for
equitable promotions and job opportunities. In short, both Collins and
Craig agreed that the Army must eventually integrate, and they wanted
the use of black servicemen restudied.[17-7]

[Footnote 17-7: IG Summary Sheet for CofS, 7 Dec 50,
sub: Policy Regarding Negro Segregation, CS 291.2
(7 Dec 50).]

Their view was at considerable variance with the attitude displayed by
most officers on the Army staff and in the major commands in December
1950. His rank notwithstanding, Collins still had to persuade these
men of the validity of his views before they would accept the
necessity for integration. Moreover, with his concept of orderly and
controlled social change threatened by the rapid rise in the number of
black soldiers, Collins himself would need to assess the effects of
racial mixing in a fluid manpower situation. These necessities explain
the plethora of staff papers, special boards, and field investigations
pertaining to the employment of black troops that characterized the
next six months, a period during which every effort was made to
convince senior officers of the practical necessity for integration.
The Chief of Staff's exchange of views with the Inspector General was
not circulated within the staff until December 1950. At that time the
personnel chief, Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, recommended reconvening
the Chamberlin Board to reexamine the Army's racial policy in light of
the Korean experience. Brooks wanted to hold off the review until
February 1951 by which time he thought adequate data would be
available from the Far East Command. His recommendation was approved,
and the matter was returned to the same group which had so firmly
rejected integration less than a year before.[17-8]

[Footnote 17-8: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 18 Dec 50,
sub: Policy Regarding Negro Segregation, G-1
291.2.]

Even as the Chamberlin Board was reconvening, another voice was added
to those calling for integration. Viewing the critical overstrength in
black units, Assistant Secretary Earl D. Johnson recommended
distributing excess black soldiers among other units of the
Army.[17-9] The response to his proposal was yet another at