he had concluded that segregation was "wholly inefficient, not to say
improper." He considered integration the only way to assure _esprit de
corps_ in any large segment of the Army. As for segregation, Ridgway
concluded, "it has always seemed to me both un-American and
un-Christian for free citizens to be taught to downgrade themselves
this way as if they were unfit to associate with their fellows or to
accept leadership themselves."[17-34] He had planned to seek
authorization to integrate the major black units of the Eighth Army in
mid-March, but battlefield preoccupations and his sudden elevation to
theater command interfered. Once he became commander in chief, however,
he quickly concurred in his inspector general's recommendation, adding
that "integration in white combat units in Korea is a practical (p. 440)
solution to the optimum utilization of Negro manpower provided the
overall theater level of Negroes does not exceed 15 percent of troop
level and does not exceed over 12 percent in any combat unit."[17-35]

[Footnote 17-34: Matthew B. Ridgway, _The Korean War_
(New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 192-93.]

[Footnote 17-35: Memorandum for File, FECOM IG, 2 May
51, copy in AG 330.1.]

The 24th Infantry's experiences struck yet another blow at the Army's
race policy. Reduce the size of black units, the Gillem Board had
reasoned, and you will reduce inefficiency and discrimination. Such a
course had not worked. The same troubles that befell the 92d Division
in Italy were now being visited in Korea on the 24th Infantry, a unit
rich with honors extending back to the Indian fighting after the Civil
War, the War with Spain, and the Philippine Insurrection. The unit
could also boast among its medal of honor winners the first man to
receive the award in Korea, Pfc. William Thompson of Company M. Before
its inactivation in 1951 the 24th had yet another member so honored,
Sgt. Cornelius H. Carlton of Company H.

_Final Arguments_

To concentrate on the widespread sentiment for integration in the Far
East would misrepresent the general attitude that still prevailed in
the Army in the spring of 1951. This attitude was clearly reflected
again by the Chamberlin Board, which completed its reexamination of
the Army's racial policy in light of the Korean experience in April.
The board recognized the success of integrated units and even cited
eviden