he Shameful Story of the Courts Martial of Negro
GIs_ (New York: NAACP, 1951).]

It would be hard to refute Marshall's contention that discrimination
was a handmaiden of segregation. Not so Walter White's contention that
the reports of the 24th Infantry's poor performance constituted an
attempt to discredit the combat ability of black soldiers and return
them to labor duties. The association's executive secretary had fought
racial injustice for many decades, and, considering his World War II
experiences with the breakup of the 2d Cavalry Division into labor
units, his acceptance of a conspiracy theory in Korea was
understandable. But it was inaccurate. The Army operated under a
different social order in 1951, and many combat leaders in the Eighth
Army were advocating integration. The number of black service units in
the Eighth Army, some ninety in March 1951, was comparable to the
number in other similar Army commands. Nor, for that matter, was the
number of black combat units in the Eighth Army unusual. In March 1951
the Eighth Army had eighty-four such units ranging in size from
regiment to detachment. Far from planning the conversion of black
combat troops to service troops, most commanders were recommending
their assignment to integrated combat units throughout Korea.

Apprised of these various conclusions, MacArthur ordered his staff to
investigate the problem of segregation in the command.[17-32] The Far
East Command G-1 staff incorporated the inspector general's report in
its study of the problem, adding that "Negro soldiers can and do fight
well when integrated." The staff went on to dismiss the importance of
leadership as a particular factor in the case of black troops by
observing that "no race has a monopoly on stupidity."[17-33]

[Footnote 17-32: Ltr, Lt Gen Edward Almond, CofS,
FECOM, to TIG, 15 Mar 51, IG 333.9.]

[Footnote 17-33: FECOM Check Sheet, IG to G-1, FEC, 27
May 51, sub: Report of Investigation; Memo, FEC G-1
for CofS FEC, 30 Apr 51, sub: G-1 Topics Which CINC
May Discuss With Gen Taylor.]

Before the staff could finish its investigation, General Matthew B.
Ridgway replaced MacArthur as Far East commander. Fresh from duty as
Eighth Army commander, Ridgway had had close-hand experience with the
24th Infantry's problems; from both a military and a human viewpoint