in the heat of battle be sustained
on the more tranquil maneuver grounds of central Europe and the
American south?

[Illustration: COLOR GUARD, 160TH INFANTRY, KOREA, 1952.]

_Integration of the European and Continental Commands_ (p. 448)

Since the Army was just 12 percent Negro in September 1951, it should
have been possible to solve Ridgway's problem of black overstrength
simply by distributing black soldiers evenly throughout the Army. But
this solution was frustrated by the segregation still in force in
other commands. Organized black units in the United States were small
and few in number, and black recruits who could not be used in them
were shipped as replacements to the overseas commands, principally in
the Far East and Europe.[17-68] Consequently, Ridgway's problem was
not an isolated one; his European counterpart was operating a largely
segregated command almost 13 percent black. The Army could not prevent
black overstrengths so long as Negroes were ordered into the
quota-free service by color-blind draft boards, but it could equalize
the overstrength by integrating its forces all over the world.

[Footnote 17-68: In 1951 the European Command was the
major Army headquarters in the European theater. It
was, at the same time, a combined command with some
20,000 members of the Air Force and Navy serving
along with 234,000 Army troops. In August 1952 a
separate Army command (U.S. Army, Europe) was
created within the European Command. Discussion of
the European Command and its commander in the
following paragraphs applies only to Army troops.]

This course, along with the knowledge that integration was working in
the Far East and the training camps, was leading senior Army officials
toward full integration. But they wanted certain reassurances.
Believing that integration of the continental commands would create,
in the words of the G-1, "obstacles and difficulties vastly greater
than those in FECOM," the Army staff wanted these problems (p. 449)
thoroughly analyzed before taking additional moves, "experimental or
otherwise," to broaden integration.[17-69] General Collins, although
personally committed to integration, voiced another widespread concern
over extending integration beyond the Far East units. Unlike the Navy