ther was temporarily in command of Company
B when that unit fought in November on the Ch'ongch'on River line. S.
L. A. Marshall later described Company B as "possibly the bravest"
unit in that action.[17-16]

[Footnote 17-14: The Korean Augmentation to the United
States Army, known as KATUSA, a program for
integrating Korean soldiers in American units, was
substantially different from the integration of
black Americans in terms of official authorization
and management; see CMH study by David C. Skaggs,
"The Katusa Program," in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-15: Memo, CO, 9th Inf, for TIG, 29 Oct
50, attached to IG Summary Sheet for CofS, 7 Dec
50, sub: Policy Regarding Negro Segregation, CS
291.2 (7 Dec 50); FEC, "G-1 Command Report, 1
January-31 October 1950."]

[Footnote 17-16: S. L. A. Marshall, "Integration,"
Detroit _News_, May 13, 1956.]

The practice of assigning individual blacks throughout white units in
Korea accelerated during early 1951 and figured in the manpower
rotation program which began in Korea during May. By this time the
practice had so spread that 9.4 percent of all Negroes in the theater
were serving in some forty-one newly and unofficially integrated
units.[17-17] Another 9.3 percent were in integrated but predominantly
black units. The other 81 percent continued to serve in segregated
units: in March 1951 these numbered 1 black regiment, 10 battalions,
66 separate companies, and 7 separate detachments. Looked at another
way, by May 1951 some 61 percent of the Eighth Army's infantry
companies were at least partially integrated.

[Footnote 17-17: ORO Technical Memorandum T-99, A
Preliminary Report on the Utilization of Negro
Manpower, 30 Jun 51, p. 34, copy in CMH.]

Though still limited, the conversion to integrated units was
permanent. The Korean expedient, adopted out of battlefield necessity,
carried out haphazardly, and based on such imponderables as casualties
and the draft, passed the ultimate test of traditional American
pragmatism: it worked. And according to reports from Korea, it worked
well. The performance of integrated troops was praiseworthy with no
report of racial fri