AREUR Units,
USAREUR AG 291.2 (1953).]

[Footnote 17-86: Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR, 10 Apr
53, USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1953), quoted in Sher
Monograph, p. 28.]

[Footnote 17-87: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical
Report, 1 January 1953-30 June 1954," p. 60, in
CMH.]

Integration of black troops in Europe proved successful on several
counts, with the Army, in Assistant Secretary Fred Korth's words,
"achieving benefits therefrom substantially greater than we
had anticipated at its inception."[17-88] The command's combat (p. 453)
readiness increased, he claimed, while its racial incidents and
disciplinary problems declined. The reaction of the soldiers was,
again in Korth's words, "generally good" with incidents stemming from
integration "fewer and much farther between." Moreover, the program
had been a definite advantage in counteracting Communist propaganda,
with no evidence of problems with civilians arising from social
integration. More eloquent testimony to the program's success appeared
in the enthusiasm of the European Command's senior officials.[17-89]
Their fears and uncertainties eased, they abruptly reversed their
attitudes and some even moved from outright opposition to praise for
the program as one of their principal achievements.

[Footnote 17-88: Memo, ASA (M&RF) for J. C. Evans,
OASD (M), 26 Nov 52, sub: Negro Integration in
Europe, SD 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-89: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 15 Nov 55,
CMH files; Ernest Leiser, "For Negroes, It's a New
Army Now," _Saturday Evening Post_ 225 (December
13, 1952):26-27, 108-12.]

The smaller overseas commands also submitted plans to Army
headquarters for the breakup of their segregated units in 1951, and
integration of the Alaskan Command and the rest proceeded during 1952
without incident.[17-90] At the same time the continental Army
commands, faced with similar manpower problems, began making
exceptions, albeit considerably more timidly than the great overseas
commands, to the assignment of Negroes to black units. As early as
September 1951 the Army G-1 discovered instances of unauthorized
integration in every Army area,[17-91] the result of either
unrectified administrative errors or the need to f