, G-3, 6 Mar 51, WDGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-41: Ltr, Maj Gen Ward Maris, G-4, for
Dir, ORO, 29 Mar 51, G-4 291.2. The Operations
Research Office, a subsidiary of the Johns Hopkins
University, performed qualitative and quantitative
analyses of strategy, tactics, and materiel. Some
of its assignments were subcontracted to other
research institutions; all were assigned by the
G-4's Research and Development Division and
coordinated with the Department of Defense.]

Their findings complemented each other. The G-1 team reported that
integration of black soldiers into white combat units in Korea had
been accomplished generally "without undue friction and with better
utilization of manpower." Combat commanders, the team added, "almost
unanimously favor integration."[17-42] The individual soldier's own
motivation determined his competence, the team concluded. The (p. 442)
contract agency, whose report was identified by the code name Project
CLEAR,[17-43] observed that large black units were, on average, less
reliable than large white units, but the effectiveness of small black
units varied widely. The performance of individual black soldiers in
integrated units, on the other hand, approximated that of whites. It
found that white officers commanding black units tended to attribute
their problems to race; those commanding integrated units saw their
problems as military ones. The contract team also confirmed previous
Army findings that efficient officers and noncommissioned officers,
regardless of race, were accepted by soldiers of both races.
Integration, it decided, had not lowered white morale, but it had
raised black morale. Virtually all black soldiers supported
integration, while white soldiers, whatever their private sentiments,
were not overtly hostile. In most situations, white attitudes toward
integration became more favorable with firsthand experience. Although
opinions varied, most combat commanders with integration experience
believed that a squad should contain not more than two Negroes. In
sum, the Project CLEAR group concluded that segregation hampered the
Army's effectiveness while integration increased it. Ironically, this
conclusion practically duplicated the verdict of the Army's surveys of
the integration of black and white units in Eur