[Footnote 17-76: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 11 Nov 55,
CMH files.]

There were exceptions. Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, the commander of the
Seventh Army, described the serious operational problems caused by
segregation in his command. Most of his black units were
unsatisfactory, and without minimizing the difficulties he concluded
in 1951 that integration was desirable not only for the sake of his
own mission but for the Army's efficiency and the nation's world
leadership. Officers at Headquarters, Supreme Allied Powers, Europe,
also recited personnel and training problems caused in their command
by segregation, but here, Ginzberg noted, the attitude was one of
cautious silence, an attitude that made little difference because
General Eisenhower's command was an international organization having
nothing to do with the Army's race policies. It would, however, be of
some interest during the 1952 political campaign when some
commentators made the false claim that Eisenhower had integrated
American units in Europe.[17-77]

[Footnote 17-77: See, for example, _Pathfinder_
Magazine 58 (May 7, 1952):11. See also Ltr, Philleo
Nash to Donald Dawson, 27 May 52, Nash Collection,
Truman Library; Ltr, Brig Gen Charles T. Lanham to
Evans, 7 Aug 51, CMH files; CINFO Summary Sheet, 12
Jun 52, sub: Query Washington Bureau, NAACP, CSA
291.2.]

Obviously it was going to take more than a visit from Ginzberg to move
the European Command's staff, and later in the year Collins took the
matter up personally with Handy. This consultation, and a series of
exchanges between McAuliffe and command officials, led Collins to ask
Handy to submit an integration plan as quickly as possible.[17-78]
Handy complied with a proposal that failed on the whole to conform to
the Army's current plans for worldwide integration and was quickly
amended in Washington. The European Command would not, Collins
decreed, conduct a special screening of its black officers and noncoms
for fitness for combat duty. The command would not retain segregated
service units, although the Army would allow an extension of the
program's timetable to accomplish the integration of these units.
Finally, the command would stage no publicity campaign but would
instead proceed quietly and routinely. The program was to begin in