ope at the end of World
War II.

[Footnote 17-42: DA Personnel Research Team, "A
Preliminary Report on Personnel Research Data" (ca.
28 Jul 51), AG 333.3.]

[Footnote 17-43: ORO-T-99, "A Preliminary Report on
the Utilization of Negro Manpower," 30 Jun 51,
S4-S6, copy in CMH. A draft version of a more
comprehensive study on the same subject was
prepared in seven volumes (ORO-R-11) in November
1951. These several documents are usually referred
to as Project CLEAR, the code name for the complete
version. The declassification and eventual
publication of this very important social document
had a long and interesting history; see, for
example, Memo, Howard Sacks, Office of the General
Counsel, SA, for James C. Evans, 3 Nov 55, in CMH.
For over a decade a "sanitized" version of Project
CLEAR remained For Official Use Only. The study was
finally cleared and published under the title
_Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S.
Army_, ed. Leo Bogart (Chicago: Markham, 1969).]

General Collins immediately accepted the Project CLEAR conclusions
when presented to him verbally on 23 July 1951.[17-44] His endorsement
and the subsequent announcement that the Army would integrate its
forces in the Far East implied a connection which did not exist.
Actually, the decision to integrate in Korea was made before Project
CLEAR or the G-1 study appeared. This is not to denigrate the
importance of these documents. Their justification of integration in
objective, scientific terms later helped convince Army traditionalists
of the need for worldwide change and absolved the Secretary of the
Army, his Chief of Staff, and his theater commander of the charge of
having made a political and social rather than a military
decision.[17-45]

[Footnote 17-44: ORO, "Utilization of Negro Manpower
in the Army: A 1951 Study" (advance draft), pp.
viii-ix, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-45: Ltr, Dir, ORO, to G-3, 20 Nov 52, G-3
291.2; see also Interv, Nichols with Davis.]

_Integratio