was exaggerated, as a meeting between Senator
Richard B. Russell and James Evans in early 1952 demonstrated. (p. 457)
At the request of the manpower secretary, Evans went to Capitol Hill
to inform the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that for
reasons of military efficiency the Army was going to integrate.
Senator Russell observed that he had been unable to do some things he
wanted to do "because your people [black voters] weren't strong enough
politically to support me." Tell the secretary, Russell added, "that I
won't help him integrate, but I won't hinder him either--and neither
will anyone else."[17-102] The senator was true to his word. News of
the Army's integration program passed quietly through the halls of
Congress without public or private protest.

[Footnote 17-102: Ibid.]

Much opposition to integration was based on the fear that low-scoring
black soldiers, handicapped by deficiencies in schooling and training,
would weaken integrated units as they had the all-black units. But
integration proved to be the best solution. As one combat commander
put it, "Mix 'um up and you get a strong line all the way; segregate
'um and you have a point of weakness in your line. The enemy hits you
there, and it's bug out."[17-103] Korea taught the Army that an
integrated unit was not as weak as its weakest men, but as strong as
its leadership and training. Integration not only diluted the impact
of the less qualified by distributing them more widely, but also
brought about measurable improvement in the performance and standards
of a large number of black soldiers.

[Footnote 17-103: Quoted in John B. Spore and Robert
F. Cocklin, "Our Negro Soldiers," _Reporter_ 6
(January 22, 1952):6-9.]

Closely related to the concern over the large number of ill-qualified
soldiers was the fear of the impact of integration on a quota-free
Army. The Project CLEAR team concluded that a maximum of 15 to 20
percent black strength "seems to be an effective interim working
level."[17-104] General McAuliffe pointed out in November 1952 that he
was trying to maintain a balanced distribution of black troops, not
only geographically but also according to combat and service
specialties (_see Tables 9 and 10_). Collins decided to retain the
ceiling on black combat troops--no more than 12 percent in any combat
unit--but he agreed that a substantially higher percen