s.[17-38]

[Footnote 17-37: Memo, Actg CofS for SA, 31 May 51,
sub: Negro Strength in the Army, CS 291.2 Negroes
(11 Apr 51); see also Interv, author with Haislip,
14 Feb 71, CMH files.]

[Footnote 17-38: Incl to Ltr, Almond to CMH, 1 Apr 72,
CMH files.]

The opinions of senior commanders long identified with segregated
units in combat carried weight with the middle-ranking staff officers
who, lacking such experience, were charged with devising policy.
Behind the opinions expressed by many staff members there seemed to be
a nebulous, often unspoken, conviction that Negroes did not perform
well in combat. The staff officers who saw proof for their convictions
in the troubles of the 24th Infantry ignored the possibility that
segregated units, not individual soldiers, was the problem. Their
attitude explains why the Army continued to delay changes made
imperative by its experience in Korea.

It also explains why at this late date the Army turned to the
scientific community for still another review of its racial policy.
The move originated with the Army's G-3, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,
who in February called for the collection of all information on the
Army's experiences with black troops in Korea. If the G-1, General
McAuliffe, did not consider the available data sufficient, General
Taylor added, he would join in sponsoring further investigation in the
Far East.[17-39] The result was two studies. The G-1 sent an Army
personnel research team, which left for Korea in April 1951, to study
the Army's regulations for assigning men under combat conditions and
to consider the performance of integrated units.[17-40] On 29 March,
Maj. Gen. Ward S. Maris, the G-4, requested the Operations Research
Office, a contract agency for the Army, to make a study of how best to
use black manpower in the Army.[17-41] The G-1 investigation,
undertaken by manpower experts drawn from several Army offices,
concentrated on the views of combat commanders; the contract agency
reviewed all available data, including a detailed battlefield survey
by social scientists. Both groups submitted preliminary reports in
July 1951.

[Footnote 17-39: Memo, ACofS, G-3, for ACofS, G-1, 22
Feb 51, WDGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-40: Memo, Chief, Pers Mgmt Div, G-1, for
CofS