from its
object?

(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?

(4) Whether it is derived from the end?

(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?

(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?

(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the
species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?

(8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?

(9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?

(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of
good or evil?

(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse,
places the moral action in the species of good or evil?
________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]

Whether Every Human Action Is Good, or Are There Evil Actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that
none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not,
save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the
good. Therefore no action is evil.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a
thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its
potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is
perfected by act, it is good, as stated in _Metaph._ ix, 9. Therefore
nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is
good. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.

Obj. 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as
Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect
which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action
is good.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 3:20): "Every one that doth
evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.

_I answer that,_ We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good
and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act
that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has
being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the
First Part (Q. 5, AA. 1, 3). But God alone has the whole plenitude of
His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its
proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it
happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and
yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the
fulness of human being requires a com