ful.

In addition to these difficulties, there prevailed almost always in
Polish political circles a certain nervous excitement, which made it
extremely difficult to enter into any calm and essential negotiations.
At the very beginning, misunderstandings occurred between the Polish
leaders and myself with regard to what I proposed to do;
misunderstandings which, toward the end of my term of office,
developed into the most bitter enmity towards me on the part of the
Poles. On February 10, 1917, a whole year before Brest-Litovsk, I
received the news from Warsaw that Herr von Bilinski, apparently
misunderstanding my standpoint, evolved from the facts, considered
that hopes represented promises, and in so doing raised Polish
expectations to an unwarranted degree. I telegraphed thereupon to our
representative as follows:

_February 16, 1917._

I have informed Herr von Bilinski, together with other Poles, that
it is impossible in the present unsettled European situation to
make, on the whole, any plans for the future of Poland. I have
told them that I sympathise with the Austro-Polish solution longed
for by all our Poles, but that I am not in the position to say
whether this solution will be attainable, though I am equally
unable to foretell the opposite. Finally, I have also declared
that our whole policy where Poland is concerned can only consist
in our leaving a door open for all future transactions.

I added that our representative must quote my direct orders in
settling the matter.

In January, 1917, a conference was held respecting the Polish
question: a conference which aimed at laying down a broad line of
action for the policy to be adopted. I first of all referred to the
circumstances connected with the previously-mentioned German request
for us to evacuate Lublin, and explained my reasons for not agreeing
to the demand. I pointed out that it did not seem probable to me that
the war would end with a dictated peace on our side, and that, with
reference to Poland, we should not be able to solve the Polish
question without the co-operation of the Entente, and that there was
not much object so long as the war lasted in endeavouring to secure
_faits accomplis_. The main point was that we remain in the country,
and on the conclusion of peace enter into negotiations with the
Entente and the Allies to secure a solution of the Austro-Polish
question. That should be the gist of our policy. Count Tisz