Poles, it appeared
better to unite the latter collectively with Germany rather than to
divide them, as suggested in the Vienna-Berlin dispute.

The plan for the annexation of Roumania presented wellnigh
insurmountable internal difficulties. Owing to her geographical
position, Roumania ought naturally to be annexed to Hungary. Tisza,
who was not in favour of the plan, would, nevertheless, have agreed to
it if the annexed country had been administered from Budapest and in
the Magyar spirit, which meant that it would be incorporated in
Hungary. This, for obvious reasons, would involve the failure of the
plan, for the Roumanians would gain no advantage from the annexation
if it was to be at the sacrifice of their national independence. On
the other hand, the Austrian Ministry raised quite justifiable
objections to the suggestion of a future combination that would add a
rich and vast country to Hungary, while Austria would be reduced in
proportion, and compensation in one or other form was demanded.
Another, but tentative, plan was to make over Bosnia and the
Herzegovina definitely by way of compensation to Austria. All these
ideas and plans, however, were of a transitory nature, evoked by the
constantly recurring difficulties in Berlin and Warsaw, and they
invariably fell through when it was seen that the obstacles arising
from dualism were not to be overcome. The original Austro-Polish
solution was taken up again, although it was impossible to extort
from the Germans a definite statement as to a reasonable western
frontier for Poland. In the very last term of my office the Roumanian
plan again came up, partly owing to the bitter feelings of the Poles
on the Cholm question, and partly owing to the claims made by Germany,
which rendered the Austro-Polish solution impossible.

Simultaneously with these efforts, a plan for the future organisation
of the Monarchy was being considered. The Emperor adhered to the
correct standpoint, as I still consider it to be, that the structure
of the Monarchy, after an endurable issue from the war, would have to
be altered, and reconstruction on a far more pronounced national basis
be necessary. As applied to the Poles, this project would entail the
dividing of East and West Galicia, and an independent position for the
Ruthenian Poles.

When at Brest-Litovsk, under the pressure of the hunger riots that
were beginning, I refused to agree to the Ukrainian demands, but
consented to submit t