nto resisting any tripartite experiments.

I would very much regret if, in connection with this question,
differences of opinion should occur among the present responsible
leaders of the Monarchy. In view of this I considered it
unnecessary to give publicity to a question that is not pressing.
At all events, in dealing with the Poles, all expressions must be
avoided which, in the improbable, although not impossible, event
of a resumption of the Austro-Polish solution, might awaken
expectations in them which could only lead to the most complicated
consequences.

The more moderate Poles had made up their minds that the dualistic
structure of the Monarchy would have to remain intact, and that
the annexation of Poland by way of a junction with the Austrian
State, with far-reaching autonomy to follow, would have to be the
consequence. It would therefore be extremely imprudent and
injurious to awaken fresh aspirations, the realisation of which
seems very doubtful, not only from a Hungarian point of view but
from that which concerns the future of the Monarchy.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest
esteem.

TISZA.

_Budapest, February 22, 1917._

The question as to what was to be Poland's future position with regard
to the Monarchy remained still unsolved. I continued to press the
point that Poland should be annexed as an independent state. Tisza
wanted it to be a province. When the Emperor dismissed him, although
he was favoured by the majority of the Parliament, it did not alter
the situation in regard to the Polish question, as Wekerle, in this as
in almost all other questions, had to adopt Tisza's views; otherwise,
he would have been in the minority.

The actual reason of Tisza's dismissal was not the question of
electoral reforms, as his successors could only act according to
Tisza's instructions. For, as leader of the majority, which he
continued to be even after his dismissal, no electoral reforms could
be carried out in opposition to his will. Tisza thought that the
Emperor meditated putting in a coalition majority against him, which
he considered quite logical, though not agreeable.

The next difficulty was the attitude of the Germans towards Poland. At
the occupation of Poland we were already unfairly treated, and the
Germans had appropriated the greater part of the country. Always and
everywhere, they were the stronger on the battlefield