hrough at
Goerlitz and the irresistible advance into the interior of Russia had
an astounding effect in Roumania. Bratianu, who obviously knew very
little about strategy, could simply not understand that the Russian
millions, whom he imagined to be in a fair way to Vienna and Berlin,
should suddenly begin to rush back and a fortress like Warsaw be
demolished like a house of cards. He was evidently very anxious then
and must have had many a disturbed night. On the other hand, those who
to begin with, though not for, still were not against Austria began to
raise their heads and breathe more freely. The victory of the Central
Powers appeared on the horizon like a fresh event. That was the
historic moment when Roumania might have been coerced into active
co-operation, but not the Bratianu Ministry. Bratianu himself would
never in any case have ranged himself on our side, but if we could
have made up our minds then to instal a Majorescu or a Marghiloman
Ministry in office, we could have had the Roumanian army with us. In
connection with this were several concrete proposals. In order to
carry out the plan we should have been compelled to make territorial
concessions in Hungary to a Majorescu Ministry--Majorescu demanded it
as a primary condition to his undertaking the conduct of affairs, and
this proposal failed owing to Hungary's obstinate resistance. It is a
terrible but a just punishment that poor Hungary, who contributed so
much to our definite defeat, should be the one to suffer the most from
the consequences thereof, and that the Roumanians, so despised and
persecuted by Hungary, should gain the greatest triumphs on her
plains.

One of the many reproaches that have been brought against me recently
is to the effect that I, as ambassador at Bucharest, should have
resigned if my proposals were not accepted in Vienna. These reproaches
are dictated by quite mistaken ideas of competency and responsibility.
It is the duty of a subordinate official to describe the situation as
he sees it and to make such proposals as he considers right, but the
responsibility for the policy is with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and it would lead to the most impossible and absurd state of
things if every ambassador whose proposals were rejected were to draw
the conclusion that his resignation was a necessary consequence
thereof. If officials were to resign because they did not agree with
the view of their chief, it would mean that almost al