ree access to the Baltic. In one way or the
other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of
the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be
superior to us.
As regards _materiel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is
distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our
equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a
superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless
energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up
some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these
advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of
an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English.
Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under
certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in
this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente
can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time.
If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of
the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany,
we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in
every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are
very different.
If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed
she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member
of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course,
very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost
equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization
and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The
French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united
spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of
the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too,
has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to
double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the
French succeed in making a large African army available for a European
theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with
ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind,
for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may
safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acqui
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