of effectively
acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South
Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and
stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the
offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the
generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale,
held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not,
according to available information, show the English army in a
favourable light so far as strategical ability went.

If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's
probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian
standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than
a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the
Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to
join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of
communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of
power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is
as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory
over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople,
but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia
in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation
for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could
be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire.

Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an
offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite
different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war.
Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against
complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not
shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for
political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such
a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion
in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast
Empire the social and also political education, especially among the
peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy
seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have
acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools
have s