assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in
a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The
troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en echelon _than in the
last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate
the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be
settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the
experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will
most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in
the domain of military science.

If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an
infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of
artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern
artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must
advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the
artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path
between these two extremes.

If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or,
better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the
guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially
adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the
conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is
reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we
must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into
account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If
we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper
strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such
infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position
taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that
section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions,
requires greater numbers and depth than before.

In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of
the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian
campaign.

Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period
extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not
rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original
strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans
on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmi