ns numerous Slavonic elements,
patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to
the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of
such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that
might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration.

We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of
standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the
Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the
struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own
resolution for victory.

Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our
political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can
only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and
by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect
continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their
interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest,
since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and
obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable,
then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own
resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of
desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would
destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize
the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would
shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus
check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for
which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war
will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind.
This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power
or downfall!" will be our rallying cry.

Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident
intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the
end, come what may.

We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted
campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our
enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to
defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last
is won.

It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numer