quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action
two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of
course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not
always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely
the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ
them as their particular character demands.

The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and
divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding
formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately
according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the
undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders
of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the
commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of
enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for
himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one
division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to
withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one
division only, the same division must always be subjected to this
reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether
this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least
worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not
be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each
division.

The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous
question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the
whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement
would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a
position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They
can also, however, be combined under the command of the
General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first
arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the
great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is
dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left
but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the
indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are
inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers
is by no means necessary in every engagement, but on