d that England will scarcely let
herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests
of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory
arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As
regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous
conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily
divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the
superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea.
Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending
party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction
with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be
deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are
the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be
employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled.
This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But
it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the
close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet
more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in
far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the
threatened flank of our attacking fleet.
After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a
mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision
of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event
of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt
to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They
could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our
naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and
Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these
places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea.
It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate
against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford
extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by
protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the
communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack
will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast
fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely
defensive
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