ow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands.
Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus
raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer
greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us
assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only
trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a
condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and
should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any
case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on
which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and
also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial
products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They
must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the
Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of
Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in
collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which
our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of
commercial mobilization.
These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us
in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a
defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our
coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack.
Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade
closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish
straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she
can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the
Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland
and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea
commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping.
A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of
the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a
blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base
and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all
the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our
coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously
increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has
recently be
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