ey
comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen,
although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often
surpassed all expectations.

But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is
necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to
achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to
public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake
there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as
unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the
principles of a sound military organization.

The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in
various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject,
and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive
consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration.

One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of
three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous
intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in
every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the
extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jaeger
battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the
hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried
out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the
drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within
the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing
the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being
thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more
ways.

The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only
be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the
enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to
each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present.
But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that
new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be
taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this
means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the
artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited,
without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the
quantity of ammun