without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units.
This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional
organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet
appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the
existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been
drawn up by competent officers.

The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two
infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The
formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix
the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his
own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a
reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of
some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity
for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a
wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this
procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible,
even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the
brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken
by the enemy and the course of the battle.

Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its
application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of
cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution
which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that
the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of
two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry
these duties out.

This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts
the most generally accepted military principles.

The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as
is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate
divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal
of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the
subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack
must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best
formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops
to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result
there.

A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by
the