losophers in his time, seems to have been no small eyesore to
Epicurus; who says of him that delivering nothing peculiar to himself
or of his own invention, he imprinted in illiterate men the opinion and
esteem of his being very knowing and learned. Now Arcesilaus was so far
from desiring any glory by being a bringer-in of new opinions, and from
arrogating to himself those of the ancients, that the sophisters of
that time blamed him for attributing to Socrates, Plato, Parmenides,
and Heraclitus the doctrines concerning the retention of assent, and the
incomprehensibility of things; having no need so to do, but only that
he might strengthen them and render them recommendable by ascribing them
such illustrious personages. For this, therefore, thanks to Colotes, and
to every one who declares that the academic doctrine was from a higher
times derived to Arcesilaus. Now as for retention of assent and the
doubting of all things, not even those who have much labored in the
manner, and strained themselves to compose great books and large
treatises concerning it, were ever able to stir it; but bringing at last
out of the Stoa itself the cessation from all actions, as the Gorgon to
frighten away the objections that came against them, they were at last
quite tired and gave over. For they could not, what attempts and stirs
soever they made, obtain so much from the instinct by which the appetite
is moved to act, as to suffer itself to be called an assent, or to
acknowledge sense for the origin and principle of its propension, but it
appeared of its own accord to present itself to act, as having no need
to be joined with anything else. For against such adversaries the combat
and dispute is lawful and just. And

Such words as you have spoke, the like you may
Expect to hear.
("Iliad," xx. 250.)

For to speak to Colotes of instinct and consent is, I suppose, all one
as to play on the harp before an ass. But to those who can give ear
and conceive, it is said that there are in the soul three sorts of
motions,--the imaginative, the appetitive, and the consenting. As to
the imaginative or the apprehension, it cannot be taken away, though one
would. For one cannot, when things approach, avoid being informed and
(as it were) moulded by them, and receiving an impression from them. The
appetite, being stirred up by the imaginative, effectually moves man to
that which is proper and agreeable to his nature, just as when there is