e of life and divinity in it, which God from himself communicated
to and mixed with matter, God may properly be called Father of the
world--since it has life in it--and also the maker of it.

And since these things come very near to Plato's opinion, consider, I
pray, whether there may not be some probability in them. Whereas the
world consists of two parts, body and soul, God indeed made not the
body; but matter being at hand, he formed and fitted it, binding up and
confirming what was infinite within proper limits and figures. But the
soul, partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, was not only the work of
God, but part of him not only made by him, but begot by him.

QUESTION III. In the Republic, ("Republic," vi. pp. 509 D-511 E.) he
assumes the universe, as one line to be cut into two unequal parts;
again he cuts each of these parts in two after the same manner, and
supposes the two sections first made to form the two genera of things
sensible and things intelligible. The first stands for the genus of
intelligibles, comprehending in the first subdivision the primitive
forms, in the second the mathematics. Of sensibles, the first
subdivision comprehends solid bodies, the second comprehends the images
and representations of them. Moreover, to every one of these four he has
assigned its proper criterion;--to the first reason; to the mathematics,
the understanding; to sensibles, belief; to images and likenesses,
conjecture.

BUT WHAT DOES HE MEAN BY DIVIDING THE UNIVERSE INTO UNEQUAL PARTS? AND
WHICH OF THE SECTIONS, THE INTELLIGIBLE OR THE SENSIBLE, IS THE GREATER?
FOR IN THIS HE HAS NOT EXPLAINED HIMSELF.

At first glance it will appear that the sensible is the greater portion.
For the essence of intelligibles being indivisible, and in the same
respect ever the same, is contracted into a little, and pure; but an
essence divisible and running through bodies constitutes the sensible
part. Now what is immaterial is limited; but body in respect of matter
is infinite and unlimited, and it becomes sensible only when it is
limited by partaking of the intelligible. Besides, as every sensible
has many images, shadows, and representations, and from one and the
same original several copies may be taken both by nature and art; so the
latter must surpass the former in number, according to Plato, who makes
things of the intellect to be patterns or ideas of things sensible,
as if the last were images and reflections. Further, Pl