ereas they cry out and are offended in
behalf of the sense, because the Cyrenaics say not that the thing
without is hot, but that the effect made on the sense is such; is it not
the same with what is said touching the taste, when they say that the
thing without is not sweet, but that some function and motion about
the sense is such? And for him who says that he has received the
apprehension of an human form, but perceives not whether it is a man,
whence has he taken occasion so to say? Is it not from those who affirm
that they receive an apprehension of a bowed figure and form, but that
the sight pronounces not that the thing which was seen is bowed or
round, but that a certain image of it is such? Yes, by Jupiter, will
some one say; but I, going near the tower or touching the oar, will
pronounce and affirm that the one is straight and the other has many
angles and faces; but he, when he comes near it, will confess that it
seems and appears so to him, and no more. Yes, certainly, good sir, and
more than this, when he sees and observes the consequence, that every
imagination is equally worthy of belief for itself, and none for
another; but that they are all in like condition. But this your opinion
is quite lost, that all the imaginations are true and none false or to
be disbelieved, if you think that these ought to pronounce positively
of that which is without, but those you credit no farther than that they
are so affected. For if they are in equal condition as to their being
believed, when they are near or when they are far off, it is just that
either upon all of them, or else not upon these, should follow the
judgment pronouncing that a thing is. But if there is a difference in
the being affected between those that are near and those that are far
off, it is then false that one sense and imagination is not more express
and evident than another. Therefore those they call attestations and
counter-attestations are nothing to the sense, but are concerned only
with opinion. So, if they would have us following these to pronounce
concerning exterior things, making being a judgment of opinion, and what
appears an affection of sense, they transfer the judicature from which
is totally true to that which often fails.

But how full of trouble and contradictions in respect of one another
these things are, what need is there to say at present? But the
reputation of Arcesilaus, who was the best beloved and most esteemed of
all the phi