he Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a
hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,
lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
Reply Obj. 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed
that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which
weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be
wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the
Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 82, seqq.).
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 7]
Whether Any External Goods Are Necessary for Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for
Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs
to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for
instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Luke
22:30): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and
(Matt. 6:20): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Matt.
25:34): "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom."
Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is
"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some
of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are
necessary for Happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, Our Lord said (Matt. 5:12): "Your reward is very
great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place.
Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in
heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to
say: "I desire nothing but this, "--"It is good for me to adhere to my
God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
_I answer that,_ For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence
of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which
consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. For
man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the
operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active
virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of
which to perform its operations.
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise nec
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