igned to it. From a simple exercise of mind, directed
to the great phenomena of nature, we acquire the knowledge of a First
Cause,--a being of infinite power and infinite wisdom; and this
conclusion is impressed upon us in a peculiar manner, when, from our own
bodily and mental endowments, we infer the attributes of him who framed
us:--"he that planted the ear," says a sacred writer, "shall he not
hear;--he that formed the eye, shall he not see;--he that teacheth man
knowledge, shall not he know?" When we trace backwards a series of
finite yet intelligent beings, we must arrive at one of two
conclusions:--We must either trace the series through an infinite and
eternal succession of finite beings, each the cause of the one which
succeeded it;--or we must refer the commencement of the series to one
great intelligent being, himself uncaused, infinite, and eternal. To
trace the series to one being, finite, yet uncaused, is totally
inadmissible; and not less so is the conception of finite beings in an
infinite and eternal series. The belief of one infinite being,
self-existent and eternal, is, therefore, the only conclusion at which
we can arrive, as presenting any characters of credibility or truth. The
superintending care, the goodness, and benevolence of the Deity, we
learn, with a feeling of equal certainty, from the ample provision he
has made for supplying the wants and ministering to the comfort of all
the creatures whom he has made. This part of the argument, also, is in
the clearest manner insisted upon in the sacred writings; when the
apostle Paul, in calling upon the people of Lystra to worship the true
God, who made heaven and earth, adds, as a source of knowledge from
which they ought to learn his character;--"he left not himself without a
witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful
seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness."

A being, thus endowed with infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, we
cannot conceive to exist without moral feelings; and, by a process
equally obvious, we arrive at a distinct knowledge of these, when, from
the moral perceptions of our own minds, we infer the moral attributes of
him who thus formed us. We have certain impressions of justice,
veracity, compassion, and moral purity, in regard to our own
conduct,--we have a distinct approbation of these qualities in
others,--and we attach a feeling of disapprobation to the infringement
of them. By a simple