of Israel, and laid
before him the hypothetical case of a rich man, who had committed an act
of gross and unfeeling injustice against a poor neighbour. The monarch
was instantly roused to indignation, and pronounced a sentence of
severe but righteous vengeance against the oppressor,--when the prophet
turned upon him with the solemn denunciation, "Thou art the man." His
moral feeling in regard to his own conduct was dead; but his power of
correct moral decision when applied to another was undiminished.

* * * * *

In regard to the whole of this subject, an important distinction is to
be made between the fundamental principle, from which actions derive
their character of right and wrong,--and the application of reason in
judging of their tendencies. Before concluding this part of the subject,
therefore, we have to add a very few observations on the influence
exerted on our moral decisions by reason,--always however in
subserviency to the great principle of conscience. The office of reason
appears to be, in the first place, to judge of the expediency,
propriety, and consequences of actions, which do not involve any feeling
of moral duty. In regard to the affections, again, a process of reason
is often necessary, not only respecting the best mode of exercising
them, but also, in many cases, in deciding whether we shall exercise
them at all. Thus, we may feel compassion in a particular instance, but
perceive the individual to be so unworthy, that what we could do would
be of no benefit to him. In such a case we may feel it to be a matter
not only of prudence, but of duty, to resist the affection, and to
reserve the aid we have to bestow for persons more deserving.

In cases in which an impression of moral duty is concerned, an exercise
of reason is still in many instances, necessary, for enabling us to
adapt our means to the end which we desire to accomplish. We may feel an
anxious wish to promote the interest or relieve the distress of another,
or to perform some high and important duty,--but call reason to our aid
respecting the most effectual and the most judicious means of doing so.
Conscience, in such cases, produces the intention,--reason suggests the
means;--and it is familiar to every one that these do not always
harmonize. Thus a man may be sound in his intentions, who errs in
judgment respecting the means for carrying them into effect. In such
cases, we attach our feeling of moral a