wishes the happiness of his creatures; consequently,
actions which promote that will and wish must be agreeable to him, and
the contrary. The method of ascertaining the will of God concerning any
action, by the light of nature, therefore, is to inquire into the
tendency of the action to promote or diminish general happiness.
Proceeding on those grounds, he then arrives at the conclusion, that
whatever is expedient is right; and that it is the utility of any moral
rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it. In his further
elucidation of this theory, Dr. Paley admits, that an action may be
useful, in an individual case, which is not right. To constitute it
right, it is necessary that it shall be "expedient upon the whole,--at
the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote, as well as
those which are immediate and direct."

In presuming to offer a criticism upon Paley, I readily concede to the
defenders of his system, that it is not to be classed with the
utilitarianism of Hume and Godwin; and that it is not, correctly
speaking, chargeable with selfishness, in holding out the happiness of a
future state as a motive to virtue. The latter part of his system is
clearly countenanced by the sacred writings; and it does appear to be a
stretch of language, to apply the term selfishness to the longing which
the sincere Christian feels for the full enjoyment of God. In regard to
the former part of his doctrine, again, it appears that Paley meant to
propose the will of God as the rule or obligation of morals, and utility
only as a criterion or guide; though it must be confessed that his
language is liable to much misconstruction, and is somewhat at variance
with itself. The real objection to the doctrine of Paley, I apprehend,
lies in his unqualified rejection of the supreme authority of
conscience, and in the mental operation which he substitutes in its
place, namely, a circuitous process of reasoning, in each individual,
respecting the entire and ultimate expediency of actions. There are two
considerations which appear to present serious objections to this part
of the system as a doctrine to be applied to practical purposes. (1.) If
we suppose a man deliberating respecting an action, which he perceives
would be eminently expedient and useful in an individual case, and which
he feels to be highly desirable in its immediate reference to that
case,--we may naturally ask, whether he is in a likely condition to find
h