pprobation to the intention
only,--we say the man meant well, but erred in judgment;--and to this
error we affix no feeling of moral disapprobation,--unless, perhaps, in
some cases, we may blame him for acting precipitately on his own
judgment, instead of taking the advice of those qualified to direct him.
We expect such a man to acquire wisdom from experience, by observing the
deficiency of his judgment in reference to his intentions; and, in
future instances, to learn to take advice. There are other circumstances
in which an exercise of reason is frequently brought into action in
regard to moral decisions;--as in some cases in which one duty appears
to interfere with another;--likewise in judging whether, in particular
instances, any rule of duty is concerned, or whether we are at liberty
to take up the case simply as one of expediency or utility. In making
their decisions in doubtful cases of this description, we observe great
differences in the habits of judging in different individuals. One shews
the most minute and scrupulous anxiety, to discover whether the case
involves any principle of duty,--and a similar anxiety in acting
suitably when he has discovered it. This is what we call a strictly
conscientious man. Another, who shews no want of a proper sense of duty
when the line is clearly drawn, has less anxiety in such cases as these,
and may sacrifice minute or doubtful points to some other feeling,--as
self-interest or even friendship,--where the former individual might
have discovered a principle of duty.

Reason is also concerned in judging of a description of cases, in which
a modification of moral feeling arises from the complexity of
actions,--or, in other words, from the circumstances in which the
individual is placed. This may be illustrated by the difference of moral
sentiment which we attach to the act of taking away the life of
another,--when this is done by an individual under the impulse of
revenge,--by the same individual in self-defence,--or by a judge in the
discharge of his public duty.

There is still another office frequently assigned to Reason in moral
decisions,--as when we speak of a man acting upon Reason as opposed to
passion. This however is, correctly speaking, only a different use of
the term; and it means that he acts upon a calm consideration of the
motives by which he ought to be influenced, instead of being hurried
away by a desire or an affection which has been allowed to usurp u