e act of judgment, we have
determined against having these feelings excited. If, notwithstanding
this determination, we happen to be brought within the influence of the
distress which we wished to avoid, we consider this as a sufficient
ground for acting, in the instance, against our sober judgment. We had
determined against it, we say, but what can you do when you see people
starving. We thus recognise as legitimate that process by which, in
certain cases, we keep ourselves beyond this influence; but we attach no
feeling of approbation to the moral condition of him who, being
subjected to the influence, can resist it; that is, who can really come
into contact with distress, and shut his heart against it. And even
with regard to the course which we here recognise as legitimate, much
caution is required, before we allow a process of the judgment to
interfere with the natural and healthy course of the moral feelings. If
the interference arises, not from a sound process of the understanding,
but from a course in which selfishness bears a considerable part, an
injurious influence upon the moral condition of the mind is the
necessary consequence. We thus perceive that, in the chain of sequences
relating to the benevolent feelings, there are three distinct
steps,--two of which are entirely under the control of the will. A man
has it entirely in his power to place himself in contact with objects of
distress, and to follow out the call of duty in considering their
circumstances, and entering into their feelings. The natural result is a
train of emotions which arise in his own mind, prompting him to a
particular line of conduct. To act upon these emotions is again under
the power of his will; and if the whole of this chain of sequences be
duly followed, the result is a sound condition of this part of the moral
economy. If either of the voluntary steps be neglected or violated, the
mental harmony is lost, and a habit is formed of unfeeling selfishness.

The principle, which has thus been illustrated by the benevolent
affections, is equally true of our other moral emotions. These emotions
are closely connected with certain truths, which are calculated to give
use to them, according to the constitution of our moral economy. Now,
the careful acquisition of the knowledge of these truths, and a serious
direction of the attention to their tendencies, are intellectual
processes which are as much under the power of our will, as are the ac