or wrong; and by which we experience shame or remorse respecting our own
conduct in particular instances, and indignation against the conduct of
others. Every one is conscious of such a mental exercise, and there are
two considerations which, I think, may be referred to as moral facts,
shewing a clear and decided difference between it and any simple process
of reasoning. (1.) I would ask whether, in deciding on his conduct,
every man is not conscious of two classes of actions, in regard to which
the processes of his mind differ widely from each other. In deciding
respecting actions of the one class, he carefully and anxiously
deliberates on their tendencies,--that is, their utility towards
himself, or to others whose welfare he has in view; and he reflects on
what was the result of his conduct in similar cases, on former
occasions. In deciding respecting actions of the other class, he enters
into no such calculations;--he feels an immediate impression, that a
certain course is right, and a certain other wrong, without looking a
single step into their tendencies. Every one is conscious of this
difference, between acting from a perception of utility and from a
feeling of obligation or a sense of duty; and it would be difficult to
prove that any perception of utility alone ever amounts to a sense of
obligation. (2.) In that class of actions to which is properly applied a
calculation of utility, we see the most remarkable differences in
judgment manifested by men, whom we regard as holding a high place in
respect both of integrity and talent. Let us take for example the
measures of political economy. A conscientious statesman feels that he
is bound to pursue measures calculated to promote the good of his
country; but the individual measures are often questions of expediency
or utility. And what an endless diversity of judgment do we observe
respecting them; and how often do we find measures proposed by able men,
as calculated to produce important public benefit, which others, of no
inferior name, with equal confidence, condemn as frivolous, or even
dangerous. If there can be such a difference of opinion respecting one
class of actions, we cannot avoid the impression that there may be
similar differences respecting others, whenever the decision is left to
a simple process of reason; and we cannot but feel some misgivings, as
to what the state of human society would be, if men, in their moral
decisions were kept together by n