ade certain laws for the general good, and then flattered mankind
into the belief that it was praiseworthy to observe them, and noble to
sacrifice a certain degree of their own gratification for the good of
others. What we call virtue thus resolves itself into the love of
praise. In regard to such a system as this, it has been thought
sufficient to point out the distinction between the immutable principles
of morality and those arrangements which are dependent upon mere
enactment. Such are many of the regulations and restrictions of
commerce. They are intended for the public good, and, while they are in
force, it is the duty of every good citizen to obey them. A change of
the law, however, changes their character, for they possess in
themselves none of the qualities of merit or demerit. But no laws can
alter, and no statutes modify, those great principles of moral conduct
which are graved indelibly on the conscience of all classes of men.
Kings, it has been said, may make laws, but cannot create a virtue.

By another modification of this system, our impressions of virtue and
vice are said to be derived entirely from mutual compact. Men, finding
that there was a certain course of action which would contribute to
their mutual advantage, and _vice versa_, entered into an agreement to
observe certain conduct, and abstain from certain other. The violation
of this compact constituted vice, the observance of it virtue.

By a theory, supported by some eminent men, as Clark and Wollaston,
virtue was considered to depend on a conformity of the conduct to a
certain sense of the fitness of things,--or the truth of things. The
meaning of this, it must be confessed, is rather obscure. It however
evidently refers the essence of virtue to a relation perceived by a
process of reason; and therefore may be held as at variance with the
belief of the impression being universal.

According to the _Theory of Utility_, as warmly supported by Mr. Hume,
we estimate the virtue of an action and an agent entirely by their
usefulness. He seems to refer all our mental impressions to two
principles, reason and taste. Reason gives us simply the knowledge of
truth or falsehood, and is no motive of action. Taste gives an
impression of pleasure or pain,--so constitutes happiness or misery, and
becomes a motive of action. To this he refers our impressions of beauty
and deformity, vice and virtue. He has, accordingly, distinctly asserted
that the words ri