ght, and certain other conduct as immutably wrong, without
any regard either to our own advantage, or to our judgment of the
tendency of the deeds. Whenever we depart from this great principle, we
reduce every moral decision to what must primarily be a process of
reasoning, and in which, from the intricate calculation of consequences
which necessarily arises, there can scarcely fail to be differences of
opinion respecting the tendency of actions, instead of that absolute
conviction which the deep importance of the subject renders
indispensable. It may, farther, be confidently stated, as a matter of
fact, that a conscientious man, in considering an action which involves
a point of moral duty, does not enter upon any such calculation of its
consequences. He simply asks himself,--is it right?--and so decides,
according to an impulse within, which he feels to be a part of his moral
constitution, susceptible of no explanation, and not admitting of being
referred to any other principle. I confess, indeed, that I cannot
perceive, how the doctrine of utility, in any of its forms, can be
reconciled with the principle of moral responsibility. For what we
commonly call vice and virtue, must resolve themselves merely into
differences of opinion respecting what is most expedient in all its
consequences, remote and collateral. We have already alluded to the
considerations which must make this decision one of extreme
difficulty;--and how can we ascribe moral guilt to that, which, though
in vulgar language we may call it vice, must very often be nothing more
than an error in judgment respecting this ultimate good.

In regard to the whole of this important subject, I cannot see the
necessity for the circuitous mental operations which have been made to
apply to it; nor can I enter into the repugnance, shewn by various
classes of moralists, against the belief of a process or a principle in
our constitution, given us for a guide in our moral relations. It is
unnecessary to dispute about its name, or even about its origin;--for
the former is of no importance, and of the latter we know nothing. The
question relates simply to its existence as a mental exercise distinct
from any process of reasoning, and the only criterion, to which the
question can be referred, is an appeal to the moral feelings of every
individual. Is there not a mental movement or feeling, call it what we
may, by which we have a perception of actions as just or unjust, right