to which ourselves and others are bound by a
certain kind of obligation;--a departure from this constitutes moral
demerit or vice;--a correct observance of it constitutes virtue.

This appears to be our primary impression of vice and virtue. The next
question is, what is the origin of the impression, or on what ground is
it that we conclude certain actions to be right and others wrong. Is it
merely from a view of their consequences to ourselves or others; or do
we proceed upon an absolute conviction of certain conduct being right,
and certain other wrong, without carrying the mind farther than the
simple act, or the simple intention of the actor,--without any
consideration of the effects or the tendencies of the action. This is
the question which has been so keenly agitated in the speculations of
Ethical science, namely, respecting the origin and nature of moral
distinctions. On the one hand, it is contended, that these moral
impressions are in themselves immutable, and that an absolute conviction
of their immutability is fixed upon us in that part of our constitution
which we call Conscience, in other words, there is a certain conduct to
which we are bound by a feeling of obligation, apart from all other
considerations whatever, and we have an impression that a departure from
this in ourselves or others constitutes vice. On the other hand, it is
maintained, that these distinctions are entirely arbitrary, or arise out
of circumstances, so that what is vice in one case may be virtue in
another. Those who have adopted the latter hypothesis have next to
explain, what the circumstances are which give rise, in this manner, to
our impressions of vice and virtue, moral approbation or disapprobation.
The various modes of explaining this impression have led to the
_Theories of Morals_.

The system of Mandeville ascribes our impressions of moral rectitude
entirely to the enactments of legislators. Man, he says, naturally seeks
only his own gratification, without any regard to the happiness of other
men. But legislators found that it would be necessary to induce him, in
some way, to surrender a position of his personal gratification for the
good of others, and so to promote the peace and harmony of society. To
accomplish this with such a selfish being, it was necessary to give him
some equivalent for the sacrifice he thus made; and the principle of his
nature which they fixed upon, for this purpose, was his love of praise.
They m