, that on the great questions of moral
truth, there may be guilt attached to a process of the understanding,
while there is both guilt and moral degradation in that mental condition
from which it springs.

A similar relation exists, as was formerly stated, between all our moral
emotions, and processes which are felt to be entirely voluntary. These
emotions are, properly speaking, not the objects of volition, nor do
they arise directly at our bidding; but, according to the constitution
of the mind, they are the natural or established result of certain
intellectual processes, and, in some sense, even of bodily action, both
of which are entirely voluntary. The emotions of compassion and
benevolence, for example, are the natural result of the sight or even
the description of scenes of distress; and the primary steps in this
process are entirely within our power to perform, if we will. We can
visit the afflicted family, listen to their tale of distress, and
consider their circumstances,--that is, give our attention to them in
such a manner that the natural and proper effect may be produced upon
our moral feelings. We can give the same kind of attention, and with a
similar result, to a case which is only described to us by another; or
we may neglect all this mental process. Engrossed with the business or
the frivolities of life, we may keep ourselves at a distance from the
persons and the scenes that might operate in this manner on our moral
feelings;--we may refuse to listen to the tale of sorrow, or, if
compelled to hear it, we may give it little attention and no
consideration. The moral feeling does not follow, and this course, after
a certain repetition, terminates in confirmed and barren selfishness. We
see many instances in which we distinctly recognise this course of
mental or moral sequence. If, in regard to a particular case of
distress, for example, we have come to a deliberate conviction of the
worthlessness of the individual, and have determined to withhold our
aid, we refuse to see him, and we decline hearing from another any
thing more of his history;--we say, we have made up our mind not to
allow our compassion to be any more worked upon in his favour. We thus
recognise the natural relation between the sight or even the description
of distress, and the production of certain feelings in ourselves:--and
we recognise also the legitimate means for preventing this influence in
certain cases, in which, by a deliberat