step of reasoning, which conveys an impression of
absolute conviction, we conclude, that he, who formed us with these
feelings, possesses, in his own character, corresponding moral
attributes, which, while they resemble in kind, must infinitely exceed
in degree, those qualities in the wisest and the best of men. In our
actual observation of mankind, we perceive these attributes impaired in
their exercise by human weakness, distorted by human passion,--and
impeded in their operation by personal wants, personal feelings, and
selfish interests. But, apart from such deteriorating causes, we have a
certain abstract idea of the full and perfect exercise of those
qualities; and it is in this pure and perfect form that we ascribe them
to the Almighty. In him, they can be impeded by no weakness,--distorted
by no passion, and impaired in their operation by no personal interest.
We therefore conclude him to be perfect in the exercise of all these
moral attributes, and to take the most rigid estimate of any
infringement of them by man:--this is what we call the holiness of God.
Even the man, who has himself departed from moral rectitude, still feels
a power within, which points with irresistible force to what is purity,
and fixes upon him a conviction that God is pure.
When we view such a Being, apart from any inferior creature, all seems
harmony and consistency;--we have only to contemplate him as high and
holy, and enjoying perfect happiness in his own spotless attributes.
But, when we view him in relation to man in a state of moral discipline,
and, in that state, tainted deeply with moral evil, a difficulty arises
of an appalling magnitude. There is ample scope now, we perceive, for
the exercise of his holiness, veracity, and justice; and he appeals in
sublime and terrible majesty, in his exalted character as a moral
governor. But, amid such a display, there is an obvious interruption to
the exercise of compassion,--especially in that essential department of
it,--mercy or forgiveness. This attribute may be exercised without
restraint by an individual, where his own interests alone are concerned,
because in him it involves only a sacrifice of self-love. But
forgiveness in a moral governor either implies an actual change of
purpose, or supposes a former decision to have been made without
sufficient knowledge of, or due attention to, all the facts by which he
ought to have been influenced;--it denotes either undue rigour in the
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