does impart gratification, and
that of the highest kind; and, in the strictest sense of the word, it
promotes the true interest of the agent, but this tendency is the
effect, not the cause; and never can be considered as the principle
which imparts to conduct its character of virtue; nor do we perform it
merely because it affords us gratification, or promotes our interest.
The hypothesis, indeed, may be considered as distinctly contradicted by
facts,--for, even in our own experience, it is clear, that the pleasure
attending an act of generosity or virtue in ourselves, as well as our
approbation of it in others, is diminished or destroyed by the
impression that there was a selfish purpose to answer by it.

There is a modification of the selfish system which attempts to get rid
of its more offensive aspect by a singular and circuitous chain of moral
emotions. We have experienced, it is said, that a certain attention to
the comfort or advantage of others contributes to our own. A kind of
habit is thus formed, by which we come at last to seek the happiness of
others for their own sake;--so that, by this process, actions, which at
first were considered only as inexpedient, from being opposed to
self-love, at length and insensibly come to be considered as immoral.
This can be considered as nothing more than an ingenious play upon
words, and deserves only to be mentioned as a historical fact, in a view
of those speculations by which this important subject has been obscured
and bewildered.

* * * * *

Another modification of the theories of morals remains to be
mentioned;--namely, that of the distinguished Paley. This eminent writer
is decidedly opposed to the doctrine of a moral sense or moral
principle; but the system which he proposes to substitute in its place
must be acknowledged to be liable to considerable objections. He
commences with the proposition that virtue is doing good to mankind, in
obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.
The good of mankind, therefore, is the subject,--the will of God, the
rule,--and everlasting happiness, the motive of human virtue. The will
of God, he subsequently goes on to shew, is made known to us, partly by
revelation, and partly by what we discover of his designs and
dispositions from his works, or, as we usually call it, the light of
nature. From this last source he thinks it is clearly to be inferred,
that God wills and