conduct,--to him who does good by stealth, or who performs acts of
exalted justice, generosity, or forbearance, under circumstances which
exclude every idea of a selfish motive,--or when self-interest and
personal feeling are strongly and obviously opposed to them. Such
conduct commands the cordial approbation of all classes of men; and it
is striking to remark how, in the highest conception of such a character
that fancy can delineate, we are met by the sublime morality of the
sacred writings, impressed upon us by the purest of all motives, the
imitation of Him who is the giver of all good;--"love your
enemies,--bless them that curse you;--do good to them that hate
you,--and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute
you;--that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for
he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain
on the just and on the unjust."--"If any man will be my disciple," says
the same great author of Christianity,--"let him deny himself."

PART II.

OF THE WILL.

Will or Simple Volition is that state of mind which immediately precedes
action;--We will a certain act; and the act follows, unless it be
prevented either by external restraint, or by physical inability to
perform it.

The actions thus produced arise out of the mental emotions formerly
treated of,--the desires, and the affections.--We desire an object, or
we experience one of the affections;--the next mental act, according to
the regular course of a reflecting mind, is proposing to ourselves the
question,--shall we gratify the desire,--shall we exercise the
affection. Then follows the process of considering or deliberating.--We
perceive, perhaps, a variety of considerations or inducements,--some of
which are in favour of gratifying the desire or exercising the
affection, others opposed to it. We therefore proceed to weigh the
relative force of these opposing motives, with the view of determining
which of them we shall allow to regulate our decision. We, at length,
make up our mind on this, and resolve, we shall suppose, to do the
act;--this is followed by the mental condition of willing or simple
volition.

In the chain of mental operations which, in such a case, intervene
between the desire and the volition, a class of agents is brought into
view which act upon the mind as moral causes of its volitions;--these
are usually called motives,--or principles of action. When treating