their bearings and tendencies;--and this we do from the conviction, that
these truths have a certain uniform tendency to influence the volitions
of a moral being, provided he can be induced seriously to attend to
them, and provided he is in that moral condition which is required for
their efficiency.

In all such cases, which are familiar to every one, we recognise,
therefore, a uniform relation between certain moral causes or motives,
and the determinations of the human mind in willing certain acts. It is
no objection to this, that men act in very different ways with the same
motives before them;--for this depends upon their own moral condition.
When treating of the intellectual powers, I alluded to the metaphysical
controversies connected with this subject, and I do not mean to recur to
them here. Our present object is entirely of a practical
nature,--namely, to investigate the circumstances which are required for
the due operation of motives or moral causes, and the manner in which
the moral feelings may be so deranged, that these fail of producing
their natural or proper effects.

* * * * *

Let us, then, suppose an individual deliberating in regard to the line
of conduct he shall pursue in a particular case;--the circumstances or
impressions which are calculated to act upon him as moral causes in
determining his volition,--that is, in deciding his conduct, are
chiefly the following: (1.) Self-love, which prompts him to seek his own
ease, interest, or gratification. (2.) Certain affections which lead him
to take into view duties which he owes to other men; such as, justice,
benevolence, &c. (3.) The impression of moral rectitude or moral
responsibility. This is derived from the great principle of conscience,
aided by the truths of religious belief. (4.) We ought to add reason of
judgment, which leads him to perceive certain tendencies of actions,
apart from their moral aspect. Now, in deciding on his conduct in any
particular instance, one man makes every thing bend to his own interest
or pleasure,--with little regard to the interests of others;--unless in
so far as the absolute requirements of justice are concerned, the
infringement of which might expose him to loss of reputation, or even to
punishment.--Another surrenders a certain portion of his personal
gratification to the advantage or comfort of others, purely as an
exercise of feeling from which he experiences satisfaction;--