ed in
practice, that these subjects of belief are in great measure matters of
opinion,--instead of being felt to rest upon the basis of immutable and
eternal truth. Can any thing be more striking than the manner in which a
late distinguished poet expresses himself on the subject of a future
life,--as if this truth were a mere opinion which could be taken up or
laid down at pleasure, to suit the taste of the individual
inquirer;--"Of the two, I should think the long sleep better than the
agonized vigil. But men, miserable as they are, cling so to any thing
like life, that they probably would prefer damnation to quiet. Besides,
they think themselves so important in the creation, that nothing less
can satisfy then pride,--the insects!"[1] Such is the frivolous
sophistry by which one, who holds a high rank in the literature of his
country, could put away from him the most momentous inquiry that can
engage the attention of a rational being.

[Footnote 1: Byron's Letters, Moore's Life, Vol. II, p. 581.]

II. Next to the acquisition of knowledge, and the formation of opinions,
calculated to act upon us as moral beings, is the important rule of
habitually attending to them, so as to bring their influence to bear
upon our volitions. He, who honestly attends to what is passing within,
will perceive that this is a voluntary exercise of his thinking and
reasoning faculties. When a particular desire is present to his mind, he
has the power to act upon the first impulse, or upon a very partial and
limited, perhaps a distorted, view of the considerations and motives by
which he ought to be influenced;--and he has the power to suspend
acting, and direct his attention deliberately and fully to the facts and
principles which are calculated to guide his determination. This is the
first great step in that remarkable chain of sequences which belong to
the regulation of the will. It is what every one is conscious of; and,
putting aside all those metaphysical subtleties in which the subject has
been involved, this constitutes man a free and responsible agent. In
this important process, the first mental state is a certain movement of
one of the desires or one of the affections;--we may use the term
Inclination as including both. The second is a reference of the
inclination to the moral causes or motives which more peculiarly apply
to it,--especially the indications of conscience, and the principles of
moral rectitude.--If these be found to