ed from the idea of the "blue-water
school," and imbued the entire service with the avowed idea that
they must get ready to fight to the death, not the French navy,
with its easy-going methods, but the German navy, allied perhaps
with some other. At the admiralty he introduced methods analogous to
those of the General Staff, to maintain the navy ready for instant
service at all times, to prepare and keep up to date mobilization
plans in the utmost detail, and to arrange plans for the conduct
of war in such wise that after a war should break out, all the
various probable situations would have been studied out in advance.

The work required at the admiralty, and still more in the fleet--night
and day and in all weathers--taxed mental and physical endurance to
the limit; but the result was complete success; for when war broke
out on the 1st of August, 1914, the British navy was absolutely
ready. Many complaints have appeared in print about the unreadiness
of Great Britain; but no one who knows anything of the facts supposes
that these criticisms include Great Britain's navy.

The United States navy in the early part of this century occupied,
relatively to others, a very ill-defined position; but the increased
interest taken in it by our people after the Spanish War, combined
with the destruction of the flower of the Russian fleet in the
Russo-Japanese War, and the crushing blow inflicted on the French
navy by the maladministration of Camille Pelletan, resulted in
placing our navy, about three years ago, in a position second only
to Great Britain's--a position which it recently has lost. Owing
to a common origin and language, our navy has always followed the
British navy, though at a somewhat respectful distance; and while
it is true that in point of mechanical inventions we are ahead, in
seamanship, navigation, and engineering on a par, and in gunnery
and tactics not far behind, yet we must admit that in policy and
in policy's first cousin, strategy, we are very far in the rear.

There are many reasons why this should be, the first being that
the British navy has nearly always lived under more stimulating
conditions than we, because the probability of war has seemed greater,
and because the United States has underestimated what reasonable
probability there has been, and failed to realize how tremendously
difficult would be the task of getting ready for it. Owing to the
present war, our people have gradually come to see