of a careful study of the "mission," ending in a
clear determination of what the "mission" really is--that is, _what
is the thing which it is desired to do?_ The second part consists
of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of the
difficulties in the way; the third part consists of a careful study,
and eventually a clear comprehension, of what facilities are available
with which to overcome the difficulties; the fourth part consists
of a careful study of the mission, difficulties and facilities, in
their mutual relations, and a "decision" as to what should therefore
be done.
Military and naval people are so thoroughly convinced of the value
of this method that they always employ it when making important
decisions, writing down the various factors and the successive
steps in regular order and in complete detail.
In this country, while naval and military people use this method
in their comparatively minor problems, the country at large does
not use it in deciding the major problem--that is, in deciding
how much navy they want, and of what composition. They do not take
even the first step toward formulating a naval policy, because
they do not study the "mission" of the navy--that is, _they do not
study the international and national situations and their bearing
on the need for a navy_. Yet until they do this they will not be
in a sufficiently informed condition of mind to determine what
the "mission" is--that is, what they wish the navy to be able to
do--because, before they can formulate the mission they must resolve
what foreign navy or navies that mission must include. If they
decide that the mission of the navy is to guard our coast and trade
routes against the hostile efforts of Liberia the resulting naval
policy will be simple and inexpensive; while if they conclude that
the mission of our navy is to guard our coast and trade routes
against the hostile acts of _any_ navy the resulting naval policy
will be so difficult and costly as to tax the brain and wealth of
the country to a degree that will depend on _the length of time
that will elapse before the date at which the navy must be ready
to fulfil that mission_.
This factor reminds us of another factor: _the minimum time in which
the navy can get ready to fulfil a given mission_ (for instance,
to protect us against any navy); and we cannot decide the mission
correctly without taking this factor into account. For example,
it would be foolish
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